What Are the Factors Behind Pay Settlements? Evidence from Spanish and British Data by Bayo-Moriones, Alberto et al.
IZA DP No. 3401
What Are the Factors Behind Pay Settlements?




























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
March 2008 
What Are the Factors Behind Pay 
Settlements? Evidence from 




Universidad Publica de Navarra  
 
Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez 
Universidad Publica de Navarra and IZA 
 
Sara Martinez-de Moretin 











P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 










What Are the Factors Behind Pay Settlements? 
Evidence from Spanish and British Data
*
 
This article presents a study of the determinants of pay settlements in a sample of Spanish 
and British establishments. We find that variables such as establishment size and age, 
foreign ownership, labour costs, the existence of internal labour markets, a strategic 
approach to human resource management and pay setting institutions are related to the 
factors that shape pay adjustments. Moreover, our findings show that there are significant 
differences in the determinants of pay settlements between Spain and Great Britain. We 
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The design of compensation systems in organisations is a topic that has been 
extensively studied in the literature. The relevance of studying compensation 
systems rests on the fact that they constitute a fundamental component of the 
employment contract. As Bryson and Forth (2006) point out, pay is not only the 
result of an economic transaction consistent of trading worker effort for a certain 
reward. Bargaining processes between employees and employers, no matter at 
which level take place, frequently influence wage levels. Labour market 
institutions and political decisions adopted by governments also shape the 
rewarding practices of firms. Moreover, employers use payment policies as a 
valuable tool for managing the workforce and, for example, motivate workers to 
exert a desired level of effort. All these indicate that pay determination is a 
complex process, which is the result of different influences.  
As an important element of the employment relationship, wages are 
reviewed when changes in the terms of this relationship occur. Pay reviews are 
costly for employers. This implies that, instead of being designed on an 
individual basis, they are frequently carried out with a certain periodicity, 
embracing groups of workers. This type of wage adjustments, known as pay 
settlements, is the centre of our analysis. Whereas the determinants of wage 
levels have been widely analysed, both empirically and theoretically (see, for 
example, Werner and Ward, 2004, for a review of the literature on this topic), 
little effort has been made to ascertain what the variables that influence pay 
settlements are. Among the most recent research on this topic we find the work 
by Ingram et al. (1999), who analyse the incidence of external factors, such as 
comparability, as well as internal influences, like firm performance, on the size 
  2of wage settlements in Britain. Likewise, Forth and Millward (2000) examine the 
factors that shape the size of pay settlements for a sample of British 
workplaces. Taking elements from the theories of pay determination, they 
investigate how changes in several variables such as the cost of living, the 
demand and supply of labour or the establishment performance affect wage 
adjustments. Brown et al. (2004) study the issue of nominal wage rigidity in 
Britain, considering the influence that labour market institutions, unions, the cost 
of living and firm performance exert on wage adjustment processes.  
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on pay settlements taking 
an approach to the issue that is somehow different to the one adopted by the 
aforementioned authors. We focus on studying the influence that a range of 
plant characteristics has on the importance given by employers to various 
factors when setting pay. As well as investigating establishment-level variables, 
we also examine the role that labour market institutions play in the process of 
pay determination. Employers’ decisions on employment matters are 
undoubtedly constrained by institutions such as statutory minimum wages, 
employment protection legislation or the institutional features of wage 
bargaining. Therefore, we can not fully understand pay setting decisions at the 
establishment level without considering the influence exerted on them by labour 
market institutions. Moreover, by improving our knowledge on how employers 
determine wage adjustments and on how labour market institutions influence 
this decision, we will obtain valuable information that could eventually help to 
design new labour market policies. These new policies could also contribute to 
reach some desired macroeconomic goals, such as the reduction of wage 
inequality or the rate of unemployment. 
  3An additional novelty of this work relays on the fact that, in order to carry 
out our research, we perform an empirical analysis using data from two different 
surveys. One of them is the well-known Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey 2004 (Department of Trade and Industry, 2005), a study on industrial 
relations and employment practices across Great Britain. The other is a newly 
created Spanish data set on human resource management practices, which has 
its origin on a survey conducted in 2006 for a representative sample of Spanish 
manufacturing establishments. The fact that we have chosen Spain and the UK 
to perform our study is not a coincidence. Well to the contrary, we have 
particularly chosen to compare these two countries since they have developed 
very different institutional scenarios, with the system of industrial relations in the 
UK being scarcely regulated whereas Spain has one of the most regulated 
systems in the world. Therefore, the study of these specific countries constitutes 
a unique opportunity for evaluating the role of labour market institutions in the 
pay setting processes.  
The UK system of industrial relations is usually referred to as 
voluntarism, term that makes reference to the aforementioned scarce legal 
regulation of employment relations and the voluntary character of collective 
bargaining that is visible in that country. In Spain, however, labour relations are 
highly regulated and collective bargaining affects a larger amount of workers. In 
addition, both countries experienced important political changes with 
implications for labour market institutions at approximately the same time. Spain 
underwent a shift in government in 1996, when the conservative party won the 
elections after more than 12 years of socialist party ruling. Only a year later, the 
Labour Party won the elections in the UK. The political decisions adopted by 
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particular, implied changes in their respective labour market policies (see 
Hamann and Kelly, 2003). Given these facts, we consider that relevant 
conclusions can be obtained from the comparison of these two countries in 
relation to the debate at hand. 
Our empirical strategy starts with the specification of a diverse set of 
hypothesis that we consider may play a role in the process of pay adjustment. 
The subsequent empirical analysis will have to corroborate or not those 
hypothesis. Specifically, we examine the implications for pay setting of 
establishment size and age, foreign ownership, the proportion of labour costs, 
the presence of internal labour markets, the existence of a strategic approach to 
human resource management (from now on HRM), and the mechanism of pay 
determination. As we have mentioned above, we also analyse the influence of 
labour market institutions on the variables of interest. The factors considered in 
the determination of pay settlements analysed in this paper are the changes in 
the cost of living, the ability to recruit or retain employees, the performance of 
the organisation and the industrial relations climate.  
We find that, when setting pay, establishments of a large size give less 
importance to the climate of industrial relations than small establishments. The 
age of the establishment is positively correlated with the importance given to 
inflation and to the performance of the plant. In their decisions concerning wage 
adjustment, foreign-owned establishments take the cost of living into account, 
but they are less concerned about their ability to recruit and retain employees 
and about their performance than other establishments. Workplaces with low 
labour costs and those without internal labour markets give more importance to 
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also positively correlated with the importance given to the social climate. An 
strategic approach to HRM implies that the performance of the plant is 
considered relevant for pay settlements. As for the mechanisms of pay 
determination, the existence of a collective agreement at sector level results in 
the establishment giving less importance to the cost of living, whereas in 
workplaces where a mechanism other than collective bargaining operate, 
employers are less concerned both about inflation and the climate of industrial 
relations. In addition, our results provide evidence which supports the 
hypothesis that the differences in labour market regulation between Spain and 
the UK influence the process of pay determination, as British establishments 
are less concerned about all the factors we have considered in our analysis. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two presents a 
theoretical examination of the factors that may determine pay settlements. 
Section three focuses on the description of the data sets used to perform our 
empirical exercise. In sections four and five we concentrate on the definition of 
the variables used in the study and present the main findings, respectively. 
Section six concludes. 
 
  62. Theoretical Background 
In this section we review the different hypotheses that are going to be tested in 
our empirical analysis. In what follows, we analyse the implications for our study 
of variables such as Establishment Size and Age, Foreign Ownership, Labour 
Costs, Internal Labour Markets, Strategic HRM, Mechanisms of Pay 
Determination and Labour Market Institutions. 
 
Establishment Size and Age 
The relationship between firm size and wages has been widely studied in the 
past. As a consequence, there exists abundant literature on this topic, revealing 
the existence of a positive effect of firm size on worker’s wages. The presence 
of this firm-size wage premium has deserved several explanations (see Belfield 
and Wei, 2004; or Lallemand et al., 2005, among others). Reviewing these 
explanations could give us some insight on the determinants of wage 
adjustments in an establishment. 
It is frequently argued that large firms display more advanced technology 
and greater capital intensity, so they require a more skilled and specialised 
workforce. Moreover, monitoring becomes more difficult as the size of the 
establishment increases (Schmidt and Zimmerman, 1991). Therefore, it could 
be expected that, when setting payments, large firms are more concerned about 
their ability to hire and retain employees. This is due to their requirements of 
qualified labour and to their need to motivate workers in order to avoid shirking.  
As Oi and Idson (1999) point out, larger establishments provide better 
working conditions for employees. They generally offer more fringe benefits, 
safer and cleaner work environments, and a larger amount of specific training. 
Moreover, the probability of survival is higher for large firms. Consequently, 
  7employment in these workplaces is expected to be more stable and more 
satisfactory for workers. The conjunction of all these elements points to the 
direction of a better climate of industrial relations, which suggests that 
employers in big establishments don’t need to use pay adjustments as a means 
of avoiding industrial conflict. 
Hypothesis 1: When taking their pay setting decisions, large 
establishments give more importance to their ability to recruit and 
retain employees than smaller ones.  
Hypothesis 2:  When setting pay, large establishments are less 
concerned about the climate of industrial relations than smaller 
ones. 
 
The relationship between establishment age and wages has also been broadly 
analysed in the literature. Brown and Medoff (2003) review some of the 
implications of the age of the establishment in order to get conclusions about its 
influence in wage determination. The authors report that, controlling for plant 
and firm size, older firms have lower probability of bankruptcy than younger 
ones (as in Brock and Evans, 1986). They also state that it is frequent for 
workers to develop their career within a single company and, consequently, 
older firms are characterised by having longer-tenured and more experienced 
workers (as in Farber, 1998; or Hall, 1982). Moreover, these firms generally 
offer better and more stable employment conditions, which range from job 
security, firm-specific training and higher and steeper wages to non-monetary 
compensation, like pensions and health insurance. In summary, workers in 
older firms usually have closer links with the organisation and enjoy better 
  8working conditions and benefits. As we have hypothesised for large plants, this 
can result in higher satisfaction for workers and, as a consequence, in an 
improved climate of industrial relations. 
It can also be argued that the age of a firm is correlated with its ability to 
pay because, as Brown and Medoff (2003) point out, companies that have been 
operating for a long time are “those with the greatest underlying profitability”. 
The ability to pay hypothesis allows us think that employers in old firms show 
less resistance to workers’ wage requests and could choose to share their rents 
with employees. Whether the rent-sharing occurs as a way to motivate workers 
to work harder or in order to avoid conflict at the workplace, we expect to 
observe a correlation between the age of establishment and the consideration 
of performance in wages setting. 
Hypothesis 3: When setting pay, old establishments give more 
importance to their performance than younger ones. 
Hypothesis 4: When taking their pay setting decisions, employers 
in old establishments give less importance to the climate of 
industrial relations than employers in younger plants. 
 
Foreign Ownership 
Multinational companies operate in different countries, where they can 
encounter diverse institutional settings. As a result, they face the challenge of 
developing a strategy for managing human resources in an international 
context. The institutional environment of the country in which the subsidiaries 
operate and its differences with the environment of the country in which the 
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regarding their choice of HRM practices (Gooderham et al., 2006).  
The issue of the influence of institutional forces on HRM in multinational 
corporations (from now on MNCs) has been analyzed by Poutsma et al. (2006). 
The authors point out that organizational practices in MNCs are the result of the 
internal and external pressures that these firms confront. On one hand, MNCs 
face the challenge of adapting to the local environment to gain legitimacy. On 
the other, multinational companies, in order to follow a global HRM strategy, 
can obtain a competitive advantage if they keep some organisational coherence 
in the practices adopted across the various subsidiaries (see Kostova and Roth, 
2002).  
Consequently, due to the challenge of operating in an international 
environment, MNCs develop more complex HRM systems. As a result, we 
expect to find differences between those establishments that belong to a 
multinational group and those that do not regarding the importance that they 
give to their ability to recruit and retain employees. In addition, if we assume 
that the subsidiaries of a multinational compete among them, they need to 
maintain a certain level of labour productivity (see Morton and Siebert, 2001). 
This implies that these companies will be more interested in hiring the right 
workers and, consequently, they will take this into account when adjusting 
wages. 
Hypothesis 5: In their pay setting decisions, foreign-owned 
establishments are more concerned about their ability to recruit 
and retain employees.  
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When designing pay policies, another variable that will be taken into 
consideration at the establishment level is the proportion of labour costs over 
total cost of production.  Therefore, a relevant question for our work concerns 
the correlation between labour costs and wage adjustments.  
In those establishments where labour costs represent a small proportion 
of production costs, labour is a relatively unimportant factor in comparison with 
capital. Capital-intensive firms need to hire more skilled and specialised workers 
in order to operate advanced technologies. This implies that the costs of 
turnover and shirking are higher in capital-intensive firms than in labour-
intensive firms. Therefore, it can be the case that firms with low labour costs are 
more concerned about personnel matters. Moreover, we can assume that, in 
establishments where labour costs constitute only a small fraction of production 
costs, changes in wages are relatively insignificant in comparison with 
establishments where the costs of personnel are higher. In the former, 
employers can be more flexible regarding their pay policies as wage increases 
do not imply significant variations in total costs (see Arai, 2003). As a 
consequence, it seems plausible to think that satisfying workers wage requests 
will be easier for employers with low labour costs. Taking all these factors into 
account, in pay setting decisions we expect to observe a negative correlation 
between labour costs and the importance given to personnel goals, such as 
recruiting and hiring needs.  
Hypothesis 6: When setting pay, establishments with low labour 
costs are more concerned about their ability to recruit and retain 
employees. 
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Internal Labour Markets 
Many firms are characterised by having internal labour markets, where 
employees’ careers develop basically within a single organisation. Hiring for the 
lower levels of the hierarchy is done at a small number of entry ports and jobs at 
higher levels are filled through internal promotion. Enduring employment 
relations, established career paths and on-the-job training are among the most 
cited features of these companies (see Brickley et al., 1997). 
The existence of internal promotions as well as employment stability can 
be an incentive for applicants to enter the firm as well as for workers to remain 
inside the organisation. Employment relations terms are often determined 
internally by formal rules and procedures instead of being governed by market 
conditions. This implies that employees in these organisations are sheltered 
from external influences in the labour market. Then, it is possible that 
organisations with internal labour markets don’t need to use pay as a 
mechanism of hiring and retaining employees.  
Internal labour markets are also frequently characterised by the 
development of efficient ways to resolve disputes through grievance procedures 
and due process arrangements, which contribute to generate a harmonious 
working environment (Baron and Kreps, 1999). Therefore, it may be the case 
that, other than using the process of pay determination, the presence of an 
internal labour market within an organisation implies the existence of means to 
ensure a good work environment.  
  12Hypothesis 7: In their pay setting decisions, establishments with 
internal labour markets are less worried about their ability to 
recruit and retain employees.  
Hypothesis 8: The existence of an internal labour market within 
an establishment implies that the climate of industrial relations is 
considered a less important variable for pay determination. 
   
Strategic Human Resource Management 
In the last decades companies have started to consider HRM as a fundamental 
asset, as well as one of the determinants of its success or failure. At the same 
time, human resource professionals have seen their participation in decision 
making processes increased, as their involvement in organisational strategy is 
considered to be key to successful HRM (see Baron and Kreps, 1999). Growing 
empirical literature has supported this idea. As a result, a new and strategic 
approach to human resource management has emerged in contrast to more 
traditional personnel practices (see Mesner-Andolsek and Stebe, 2005). 
Strategic HRM implies the participation of the HR function in the 
development of the organisation’s strategy through the common personnel 
activities of recruiting, selecting, training, evaluating and rewarding. The scale of 
strategic HRM in a firm can be measured by the implication of HR professionals 
in strategy formulation and implementation (Farndale, 2005). As Schuler and 
Jackson (2005) point out, this approach to HRM is based on the idea that 
“human resource management activities should contribute to business 
effectiveness” and, to do so, it is needed that HRM activities are linked to the 
objectives of the organisation. As we have mentioned above, the design of 
  13appropriate compensation systems is included in the function of HRM. 
Consequently, establishments willing to adopt a strategic approach to HRM will 
design their pay policies accordingly. In particular, our tentative hypothesis is 
that they will tie pay adjustments to their performance in order to align wages 
with the particular needs of the workplace. 
Hypothesis 9: Establishments that adopt a strategic HRM 
approach give more importance to their performance when they 
set payments.  
 
Mechanisms of Pay Determination 
Pay determination arrangements impose restrictions on the wage 
structure of firms. In some organisations, working conditions and, particularly, 
pay policies are the result of bargaining processes between employers and 
workers’ representatives, resulting in the application of agreements that 
regulate the employment relationship. Collective bargaining can take place at 
different levels, and the interests pursued and the agreements reached may 
vary depending on the level at which negotiation takes place. On the contrary, 
there are organisations in which pay is set unilaterally by management following 
considerations that can be very different from those of companies covered by 
collective agreements. Previous studies on this topic have shown that the 
mechanism of pay determination influence various dimensions of pay policies, 
specially wage levels and wage dispersion (see Plasman et al., 2007; Canal 
Domínguez and Rodríguez Gutiérrez, 2004; and Cardoso and Portugal, 2003, 
among others). Taking all this into account, we expect that bargaining regimes 
are correlated with the factors that employers take into account when setting 
pay.  
  14It is reasonable to think that, if employees have the possibility of 
bargaining wage adjustments with employers, they will fight for maintaining their 
purchasing power. If this is the case, then it also seems reasonable that the 
cost of living is considered more important when taking pay setting decisions in 
those establishments where a collective agreement exists, whether it is at plant, 
organisation or sector level, than in those establishments where pay is 
determined by some other mechanism.  
Finally, we predict a positive relationship between the existence of a 
collective agreement (at sector, organisation or plant level) and the importance 
given to the industrial relations climate when setting pay. This is due to the fact 
that collective bargaining commonly pursues the establishment of harmonious 
employer-employee relations, and consequently reflects an underlying concern 
on the employer’s side regarding the importance of creating a good work 
environment. Moreover, employees can see the processes of bargaining as a 
mechanism to express their voice in employment matters, which will eventually 
contribute to the existence of good relations with the management. 
Hypothesis 10: When setting payments, establishments covered 
by a collective agreement at plant, firm or sector level give more 
importance to inflation. 
Hypothesis 11: In their pay setting decisions, establishments 
covered by a collective agreement at plant, firm or sector level 
are more concerned about the industrial relations climate. 
 
  15Country Effects  
In order to examine the influence of labour market institutions in the 
determination of payments, we describe the most relevant aspects of the 
industrial relations system in Spain and the UK. We also report the main 
political decisions adopted in these countries concerning labour market 
regulation during the years prior to the collection of the data sets used in our 
analysis.  
Spain features a highly regulated labour market. Collective bargaining is 
governed by the Constitution of 1978, which guarantees the right to collective 
bargaining between workers’ representatives and employers, and protects the 
binding power of agreements. The structure of collective bargaining is quite 
fragmented. Workers not affected by bargaining at the firm level are covered by 
a sectoral agreement at national or regional level. Collective agreements are 
extended by law to non-affiliated firms or workers belonging to the area of 
negotiation (see Canal Domínguez and Rodríguez Gutiérrez, 2004). As a result, 
bargaining coverage in Spain is high
1. 
During the years of socialist government, employment protection in Spain 
was considerably high. The conservative party tried to make employment 
conditions more flexible with a reduction of the severance payments and the 
employers’ contributions to social security, and facilitating the dismissal of 
permanent workers. However, after all these changes, employment protection in 
Spain remains high. According to OECD’s ranking of the strictness of 
employment legislation (see OECD, 2004), in a scale ranging from 0 to 6 Spain 
had a punctuation of 3.1 in 2003, whereas the score for the UK in this year was 
1.1. As for industrial conflict issues, according to the European Industrial 
  16Relations Observatory (2007), strike activity in Spain is important in comparison 
with other EU countries and pay issues seem to be the main reason for it.  
The system of industrial relations in the UK is characterised by the 
scarce legal regulation of employment relations and the voluntary character of 
collective bargaining. Collective agreements are not enforceable by law. The 
deregulation of the British labour market was particularly noticeable during the 
1980s and 1990s with the conservative government. Hence, several laws were 
passed in this period with the aim of limiting trade union power and restricting 
collective bargaining. In 1997, with the arrival to power of the labour party, some 
important measures concerning labour market regulation were adopted, 
although many of the policies in place from previous years remain unchanged 
(Hamann and Kelly, 2003). Moreover, collective bargaining continues to be 
highly decentralised and scarcely co-ordinated, and takes place at sector, 
workplace or, more frequently, at company level. The Employment Relations 
Act of 1999 (in what follows ERA 1999) introduced a statutory union recognition 
procedure, but its impact has been limited and overall collective representation 
has continued to decline in recent years
2. 
As for wage determination, the decline in collective industrial relations 
initiated in 1979 has diminished the role of collective bargaining as the 
instrument used to set pay for employees. As a result, British employers have 
more freedom now to determine wage increases without being restricted by a 
strong regulatory framework. This is in contrast with the Spanish case, where 
pay increases are determined strongly by collective bargaining, commonly at 
sectoral level. The fact that in the UK the process of wage negotiation is more 
decentralised, and frequently determined unilaterally by management, takes us 
  17to think that British establishments will find it easier to link pay adjustments to 
the results of the workplace.  
During the government of Margaret Thatcher, employment protection 
was significantly reduced with an increase in the qualifying period for protection 
against unfair dismissal and a decrease in dismissal costs. The ERA 1999 
increased employment protection to a certain extent with measures such as an 
increase in maximum compensation for unfair dismissal and a slight reduction in 
the period of tenure necessary to enjoy employment protection rights. However, 
some aspects of employment protection inherited from the period under 
conservative government remain unchanged, so protection in the UK continues 
to be low (see Morton and Siebert, 2001). Therefore, the employment contract 
is more flexible in the UK than in Spain, suggesting that hiring and retaining the 
right workers is an issue of higher importance for Spanish employers than for 
British ones.  
Another relevant aspect of a system of industrial relations is the climate 
of employment relations. During the conservative government, strong 
restrictions were imposed on union organisation and on industrial action as a 
mechanism of defence of the terms and conditions of employment. Moreover, 
compulsory unionism was outlawed. The New Labour government maintained 
the restrictions to strike activity. According to the European Industrial Relations 
Observatory (2007), compared to other EU countries, industrial conflict in the 
UK is relatively low. Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that when setting 
pay, Spanish establishments will be more concerned about industrial action 
than establishments in the UK, since in the latter country the climate of 
  18employment relations seems to be less conflictive and union activity is more 
restricted. 
Hypothesis 12: When setting pay, British establishments are less 
concerned about their ability to recruit and retain employees than 
Spanish workplaces. 
Hypothesis 13: When setting pay, the performance of the 
organisation or the workplace is a factor that British establishments 
take more into account.  
Hypothesis 14: When setting pay, British establishments give less 
importance to the climate of industrial relations than Spanish 
plants.  
 
3. Data Description 
Our analysis is based on data from two sources. The first one is a Spanish data 
set collected in 2006 as part of a survey on HRM in the Spanish manufacturing 
industry. The second data base is the WERS 2004, which comprises a 
nationally representative sample of British establishments that provides 
information about the organisation of management-employee relations, and its 
impact on employer performance.  
 
Spain 
The Spanish data was gathered in 2006 through personal interviews with 
managers in manufacturing plants with fifty or more employees, and represents 
a unique source of information about diverse practices in Spanish firms. The 
project was intended to be a partial continuation of a previous study on HRM 
  19and operations management carried out in 1997. Information was collected at 
the plant level, the unit at which decisions about the implementation of the 
practices of interest are taken. Furthermore, knowledge of the issues included 
in the questionnaire is expected to be greater at plant level and, as a 
consequence, the data obtained should be more reliable. 
Once defined the objectives and scope of our study, and in order to 
properly design the questionnaire, a thorough examination of the literature 
related to the purpose of the project was carried out. With the information 
gathered, a first draft of the questionnaire was drawn up jointly by the members 
of the research group and the firm in charge of the fieldwork. The questionnaire 
was pre-tested in nine plants and then modified in several ways to come up with 
its final version.  
The final version of the questionnaire consists of 152 questions grouped 
in the following eight sections: General Characteristics of the Plant and the 
Firm, Human Resources, Payment Systems, Work Organisation, Human 
Resource Outcomes, Human Resource Function, Other Groups of Workers and 
Characteristics of the Plant Manager. Most of the information on HRM refers 
exclusively to blue-collar workers, that is, those workers involved directly in the 
production process. The reason for restricting the analysis to this category of 
employees lies on the existence of diverse internal labour markets with different 
features within the same organisation. Limiting the study to manual workers 
must facilitate comparisons across establishments. 
The data was drawn from personal interviews with one of the managers 
at the plant. At first, it was thought that questions should be addressed to the 
general manager or to the human resource manager. Finally, it was decided 
  20that any manager at the plant was qualified to complete the questionnaire, 
being the human resource manager the figure most frequently interviewed.  
The universe of potential respondents for the purposes of the project was 
constituted for all Spanish manufacturing establishments with fifty or more 
employees in 2005, which amounts to 6.971 units. The aim was to obtain a 
sample of one thousand units, in order to get conclusions that could be 
extended to the entire Spanish manufacturing industry. After stratification by 
sector, size and location, a random selection of workplaces was obtained from 
the Spanish Central Directory of Firms (Directorio Central de Empresas, 
DIRCE) of the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, INE), using data from 2005.  
The interviews with those managers that agreed to answer our 
questionnaire were performed by specially trained professionals using computer 
assisted telephone interviews (CATI). The establishments were first approached 
by a letter or an email indicating the goals of the survey and including a copy of 
the questionnaire.  
 
Britain 
The British data come from the WERS 2004, the fifth round of a series of 
surveys that have mapped industrial relations and employment practices in 
Great Britain since 1980. The survey collects information from managers with 
responsibility for employment relations or personnel matters, trade unions or 
employee representatives and employees themselves. It covers both private 
and public sectors and almost all industry sectors. Analogously with the Spanish 
survey, the unit of analysis is the workplace or establishment.  
  21WERS 2004 follows the line of previous rounds with both a Cross-
Section and a Panel element, and maintains the core questions so that 
comparisons with prior data sets are possible. However, some innovations have 
been introduced in the design of the new questionnaire. An important new 
element is the inclusion in the scope of the analysis, for the first time, of 
workplaces with between five and nine employees, which expands the 
reference universe to 700,000 workplaces (33 per cent of all workplaces in 
Britain). 
For the purposes of this study, information was taken from one of the 
WERS sources, the Cross-Section Management Questionnaire. The main 
element of this survey was an interview with the senior manager at the 
workplace with a day-to-day responsibility for employment relations. The 
interview contains questions on the following 12 topics: Establishment and 
Organisation Characteristics; Management of Personnel and Employment 
Relations; Recruitment, Training and Organisation of Work; Consultation and 
Communication; Representation at Work; Payment Systems and Pay 
Determination; Collective Disputes and Procedures; Grievance and Disciplinary 
Procedures; Fair Treatment at Work; Establishment Flexibility; Establishment 
Performance and Workplace Change. 
The sample for the Cross-Section was constructed using the Inter-
Departmental Business Register (IDBR), maintained by the Office for National 
Statistics. After stratifying the sample by workplace size and industry, 
workplaces were randomly selected from within a particular size brand and 
industry. The intention was to conduct interviews in 2,500 workplaces as part of 
the Cross-Section Survey. In the end, a total amount of 2,295 valid interviews 
  22with managers were obtained (see Kersley et al., 2006 for more information on 
the WERS 2004).  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that prior to perform any regression, and in 
order to be able to compare plants with similar characteristics, we selected for 




In what follows we describe the variables used in the empirical analysis. The 
sample means, standard deviations and definitions of the variables are 
presented in Table 1.  
Both the Spanish and British questionnaires provide information on the 
factors that influenced pay settlements in the establishments surveyed. The four 
factors considered are Changes in the cost of living, Ability to recruit or retain 
employees,  Performance of the organisation or workplace and Industrial 
relations climate. In the Spanish questionnaire, respondents were required to 
value the importance given to these factors when determining pay in a scale 
ranging from 0 (not important) to 10 (very important). In the British survey, 
managers were asked if the factors mentioned above influenced or not the size 
of pay settlements or reviews. In order to merge the information from both data 
sets, it was necessary to recode the Spanish scale variables into dichotomous 
variables. The transformations we considered to be more plausible are the 
following: 
  23•  Values 0 to 4 in the Spanish questionnaire → Factor not taken into 
account when setting pay; values 5 to 10 → Factor taken into account 
when setting pay. 
•  Values 0 to 5 in the Spanish questionnaire → Factor not taken into 
account when setting pay; values 6 to 10 → Factor taken into account 
when setting pay. 
•  Value 0 in the Spanish questionnaire → Factor not taken into account 
when setting pay; values 1 to 10 → Factor taken into account when 
setting pay. 
We performed the estimations using the three transformations of the 
variables, and the differences in the results obtained were negligible. 
Eventually, we opt for the third recodification as we considered it to be the most 
consistent with the dichotomous measures of the dependent variables. 
The set of covariates which are relevant to our analysis are the following:  
•  Establishment size: both surveys provide information on the number 
of workers employed at each establishment. We include the logarithm 
of the number of employees in order to control for possible size 
effects. 
•  Age of the establishment: British respondents were asked for how 
many years the establishment had been in operation. In the Spanish 
questionnaire, managers reported the year of foundation. We include 
a variable that informs of the log of the number of years in business 
for each plant.  
•  Ownership: both surveys contain several questions regarding the 
ownership structure of the firms. Using this information, we construct 
  24the variable Multinational, which takes value one if the firm belongs to 
a multinational group and zero otherwise. 
•  Labour costs: another variable of interest in our study is the 
percentage of total production costs that is accounted for by labour 
costs. We use the information provided by the surveys in order to 
create four dummy variables. The first variable takes value one if 
labour costs are below 25 per cent of total production costs; the 
second takes value one if they are between 25 and 49 per cent; the 
third takes value one if they are between 50 and 74 per cent; and the 
fourth takes value one if they account for 75 per cent or more of 
production costs. Our reference variable will be the fourth one, so we 
exclude it from the regressions. 
•  Internal Labour Markets: we also attempt to control for the influences 
of internal labour markets on pay settlements.  In both data sets, the 
existence of these markets is measured in terms of the approach to 
filling vacancies adopted in a workplace. We include a categorical 
variable that takes value one if internal applicants are the only source 
when filling vacancies at the workplace, value two if internal 
applicants are given preference, value three if internal and external 
applicants are treated equally, value four if external applicants are 
given preference and value five if external applicants are the only 
source when filling vacancies.  
• Strategic HRM: both questionnaires contain several questions 
regarding the implication of the establishment’s management in 
personnel matters. With this information, we construct a dummy 
  25variable that takes value one if there is someone at the plant or 
organisation’s Board of Directors with specific responsibility for 
employment relations, and zero otherwise. The variable reflects the 
strategic role of the human resource department. 
•  Settlement of pay conditions: Spanish managers are enquired about 
the mechanism that most closely resembles the way in which the pay 
is set for manual workers. British respondents are asked the same 
question for each category of employees, and we select the response 
referring to each establishment’s largest occupational group. With this 
information, we create three dummy variables, which state whether 
conditions are settled through collective agreement at the plant or firm 
level, through sectoral agreement or by some other way, respectively. 
The first variable will be taken as omitted cathegory in the empirical 
analysis. 
•  Country: we address the issue of the influence that the country’s 
labour market institutions may have in the determination of pay by 





In this section, we report the results of our empirical analysis. Since the 
dependent variables are dichotomous, we used logit models in our estimations. 
We estimated four equations, one for each of our dependent variables. Our 
findings are documented in Table 2. 
  26Several interesting relationships have been detected. Large 
establishments are more concerned about the climate of industrial relations 
when setting payments, which supports the hypothesis that these plants tend to 
offer better working conditions as well as employment stability. However, we 
find no significant relationship between workplace size and the ability to recruit 
and retain employees. Our results show a positive correlation between the age 
of the establishment and our variables of inflation and performance. Contrary to 
our thinking, we find no relationship between the number of years in business 
and the climate of industrial relations. 
Controlling for the remaining variables in the model, establishments 
belonging to a multinational group have a higher probability of considering the 
cost of living when setting payments than establishments that do not belong to a 
multinational corporation. On the contrary, they give less importance to their 
ability to recruit and retain employees, and to their performance in their 
decisions concerning wage adjustment. These results do not confirm our 
thinking regarding the influences of foreign ownership on the factors that shape 
pay settlements.  
The absence of an internal labour market within the establishment is 
positively correlated, as predicted, with the importance given to hiring issues 
and to the industrial relations environment. The evidence also supports our 
belief that establishments with low labour costs are more interested in the 
recruitment and retaining of employees. The variable representing the strategic 
approach to HRM shows a positive and significant correlation with the 
performance of the establishment, which sheds light on the idea that this 
  27approach to HRM implies an alignment of HR practices with the needs of the 
organisation. 
Our hypothesis regarding the influence of the variables that represent the 
mechanisms of pay setting are generally confirmed by the empirical findings. 
Establishments affected by a regime of pay determination different than 
collective bargaining at plant, firm or sector level are less concerned about the 
cost of living and the climate of industrial relations when setting payments. 
However, a significant negative relationship between inflation and the existence 
of a sectoral agreement emerges, suggesting that there are differences in the 
importance given to the cost of living between establishments with this type of 
bargaining regime and those where single-employer negotiation takes place.  
Finally, our results provide evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
differences in labour market regulation between countries influence the process 
of pay determination. However, according to the results obtained, British 
establishments are less concerned about all the factors we have considered in 
our analysis of pay settlements, which contradicts our assumption that they 




The present study has attempted to identify the factors that influence pay 
settlements in Spanish and British establishments. In particular, we have 
investigated the determinants of the importance given to the cost of living, the 
ability to recruit and retain employees, the performance of the establishment or 
the firm, and the climate of industrial relations for pay adjustments. Several 
  28interesting relationships among the variables analysed here have emerged, and 
we hope they serve to launch research on this topic. 
Overall, the establishment level data provide empirical support to the 
hypotheses formulated. However, some unexpected relationships have 
emerged between those establishments belonging to a multinational corporation 
and our variables of interests. Moreover, the empirical evidence contradicts 
some of our views concerning the differences in pay settlement between 
Spanish and British establishments. Clearly, further research on these issues is 
required in order to properly explain the nature of these relationships. Our 
results reflect the existence of highly significant differences in pay setting 
between Spain and the UK. Certainly, labour market institutions matter when it 
comes to pay decisions. For the moment, our findings support that the Spanish-
British comparison is highly relevant and not only coincidental.  
It should be pointed out that this study has several limitations related to 
the merging of information from two different surveys. On the one hand, 
Spanish data refers exclusively to establishments belonging to the private 
sector, whereas British data contain information on both public and private 
workplaces. Furthermore, the Spanish analysis is limited to establishments with 
50 or more employees, while the British sample consists of workplaces with five 
or more workers. ¿¿¿ Differences in ownership and size could lead to variations 
in pay policies between establishments, and future research should try to 
address this caveat in our study. Finally, it would be interesting to replicate our 
analysis using data from other countries in order to get a deeper understanding 
of the influence that institutions exert on pay settlements. 
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Notes 
1. According to the European  Industrial Relations Observatory (2007) in 2005, 
collective agreements at sectoral and provincial level represented 21 per cent of 
the total collective agreements and covered 55 per cent of workers, whereas 
national collective agreements amounted to 1.5 per cent of the total agreements 
and covered 27.4 per cent of workers. At the same time, company level 
agreements represented 75 per cent of the total agreements, but covered only 10 
per cent of total work force.  
2.  In 2004, only 35 per cent of British employees are covered by a collective 
agreement, compared to 70 per cent on average in Europe (Kersley et al, 2006).   
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  34Tables 
 
Table 1 : Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Inflation  Dummy variable: 1 if changes in the cost of living influence 
pay settlements, 0 otherwise 
0.840 0.368 
Recruitment  Dummy variable: 1 if the ability to recruit or retain 
employees influence pay settlements, 0 otherwise 
0.640 0.482 
Performance  Dummy variable: 1 if the economic or financial performance 
of the organisation or workplace influence pay settlements, 
0 otherwise 
0.740 0.439 
Climate  Dummy variable: 1 if industrial relations climate influence 
pay settlements, 0 otherwise 
0.610 0.489 
Country  Dummy variable: 1 if United Kingdom, 0 otherwise  0.240  0.425 
Size  Number of employees (natural log)  4.816  1.016 
Age  Age of the establishment, in years  (natural log)  3.366  0.814 
Multinational  Dummy variable: 1 if the plant belongs to a foreign-owned 
firm, 0 otherwise 
0.240 0.427 
Labour costs < 25%  Dummy variable: 1 if labour costs below 25% of production 
costs, 0 otherwise 
0.320 0.468 
Labour costs 25-49%  Dummy variable: 1 if labour costs between 25% and 49%  
of production costs, 0 otherwise 
0.470 0.499 
Labour costs 50-74%  Dummy variable: 1 if labour costs between 50% and 74%  
of production costs, 0 otherwise 
0.190 0.393 
Labour costs > 74%  Dummy variable: 1 if labour costs above 74% of production 
costs, 0 otherwise (reference category) 
0.168 0.374 
Internal Labour Markets  1 if internal applicants are the only source (no external 
recruitment), 2 if internal applicants are given preference, 
other things being equal, over external applicants, 3 if 
applications from internal and external applicants are 
treated equally, 4 if external applicants are given 
preference, other things being equal, over internal 
applicants, 5 if external applicants are the only source (no 
internal recruitment) 
1.810 1.461 
Strategic HRM  Dummy variable: 1 if HR professional on Board of Directors, 
0 otherwise 
0.708 0.455 
Sectoral agreement  Dummy variable: 1 if pay set by collective bargaining at 
sectoral level, 0 otherwise 
0.380 0.487 
Collective agreement  Dummy variable: 1 if pay set by collective bargaining at 
organisation or plant level, 0 otherwise 
0.460 0.498 




  35Table 2. Determinants of Pay Settlements: Logit Models 










































































































Chi-squared 71.154  92.696  60.577  540.508 
% correct predictions  85.5  71.0  76.0  89.7 
N  757 755 753  755 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses  
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